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ALL ASPIRATIONS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL:
THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL
ASPIRATIONS ON ACQUISITION BEHAVIOR
ABSTRACT
Research on performance aspirations has tended to assume that historical 
and social aspirations work in parallel and influence strategic behavior in a 
similar manner. We posit that these two distinct modes of performance 
comparison in fact lead to dissimilar firm behavior. We also explore how 
variability in prior acquisition performance influences the relationship 
between aspiration levels and subsequent strategic behavior. We examine 
our questions in the context of mergers and acquisitions within the US 
commercial banking industry from 1988-2005. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find that firms’ acquisition behavior varies significantly 
depending on whether historical or social comparisons are used. We also find
that high variability in the previous acquisition performance of the firm 
intensifies the relationship between acquisition performance relative to 
aspirations and the probability of the firm making acquisitions below 
historical and social aspirations, but attenuates the relationship above such 
aspirations.
Keywords: aspiration levels; performance variability; mergers and 
acquisitions.
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Research on performance feedback has grown substantially in recent 
years (e.g., Audia & Greve, 2006; Baum et al., 2005; Mishina et al., 2010). A 
cornerstone of the theory is a model in which firms set their aspiration levels 
to reflect organizational goals, which then serve as a benchmark for 
assessing observed performance (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012).
These aspiration levels facilitate the interpretation of prior performance, 
which in turn influences the probability of organizational change by 
modifying managerial risk preferences and search behavior. Scholars have 
focused on two aspiration levels that emerge from different sources of 
performance feedback: historical (based on the firm’s own performance 
history) and social (based on the performance of a reference group of firms), 
and generally posit that they trigger similar behavioral responses (e.g., 
Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998; Harris & Bromiley, 2007). Specifically, firms 
that fail to achieve aspiration levels—whether historical or social—engage in 
problemistic search which often leads to risky organizational change; those 
that exceed aspiration levels manifest reduced search activity and reinforced
strategic persistence (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Shapira, 1987).
We take a novel perspective, positing that historical and social 
aspiration levels give rise to different managerial behaviors because the 
respective underlying benchmarks and processes are distinct and are 
interpreted differently by managers. Historical aspiration levels enable 
performance evaluation by comparing a firm’s current and past 
performance, while social aspiration levels enable current performance to be 
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compared with that of other firms. Historical aspirations are accessible and 
pertinent because they are history-dependent and reflect a firm’s capabilities
and resources (Greve, 2003a: 42). Social aspiration levels allow for 
benchmarking (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995) but are often ambiguous 
because, although it is relatively easy to observe performance outcomes, 
discursive information on other firms required to identify the underlying 
factors contributing to the observed outcomes is rarely available and often 
incomplete (Baum & Ingram, 2002). Despite these fundamental differences 
in their origins and encoded information, no previous research on aspiration 
levels has theorized and hypothesized differential effects of historical and 
social aspiration levels on firm behavior, a surprising omission given that 
many prior studies on aspiration have tested them separately and they have 
often yielded inconsistent empirical findings (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 
2003b; Shipilov, Li, & Greve, 2011). In seeking to fill the gap and to advance 
performance feedback theory, we posit that historical and social aspiration 
levels induce different interpretations as they arise from distinct sources of 
performance information and are filtered through dissimilar cognitive and 
organizational processes, and that they influence firm behavior and choices 
accordingly. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to develop 
and test theories of why managers respond differently to historical and social
aspiration levels.
Another dimension that has been overlooked in the organizational 
learning literature concerns the role of past performance variability in 
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performance interpretation (Denrell, 2005), which influences managers’ 
interpretations of current performance by modifying their perceptions of the 
reliability of performance signals. Low variability—i.e., performance that 
does not fluctuate wildly—makes it easier to interpret prior performance and 
allows for more reliable predictions of future performance, whereas high 
variability makes interpretation more challenging since managers are 
uncertain whether to attribute the observed performance to firm capabilities 
or external (and even random) factors. Thus performance variability is likely 
to play a significant role in how managers understand their performance. 
Although, performance variability has been frequently employed as a 
measure of firm risk in prior studies (e.g., Bowman, 1980; Bromiley, 1991; 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988), little work has examined its role on 
managerial interpretations of performance feedback, a key focus of this 
study.
We examine managerial performance interpretations in the context of 
corporate acquisitions. Despite a poor track record in this domain, firms 
nonetheless continue to pursue acquisitions as a strategic option (Kim, 
Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011). Although prior acquisition performance is a 
key modifier of acquisition behavior, the role of prior acquisition performance
in determining future acquisition behavior remains poorly understood. To 
draw valid inferences from previous acquisition performance requires 
meaningful evaluation of the related performance outcomes, but this can be 
complicated as acquisitions are complex events that involve many 
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organizational and strategic considerations (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Indeed, 
managerial understanding of acquisition performance will be subject to 
multi-faceted interpretations according to the history of the firm and the 
context in which it operates. To guide future acquisitions, managers attend 
closely to the factors that contribute to acquisition success and failure 
(Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). Since acquisitions are discrete events
that may be unambiguously observed and are considered important by 
stakeholders, they provide a fertile context in which to study performance 
feedback-based learning.
Our study makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, 
whereas empirical work on aspiration levels has overlooked the respective 
behavioral consequences of historical and social aspirations (e.g., Baum et 
al., 2005; Greve, 1998; Iyer & Miller, 2008), we identify differences in how 
managers interpret these measures of performance feedback, with major 
consequences for their subsequent strategic behavior. Second, despite the 
importance of performance variability in performance appraisal and 
organizational learning, its role in performance feedback-based learning has 
received little scholarly attention. We seek to expand understanding of 
performance feedback-based learning by investigating how the variability of 
a firm’s past acquisition performance moderates the effects of performance 
feedback on acquisition behavior. Third, we advance research in corporate 
acquisitions by examining how different interpretations of prior acquisition 
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performance influence future acquisition behavior, thereby shedding light on 
the relationship between the two.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Acquisition Performance Feedback and Subsequent Acquisition 
Behavior
Problemistic search, a key concept in the behavioral theory of the firm,
has influenced many streams of management research, including 
organizational learning (e.g., Levitt & March, 1988), risk-taking (e.g, 
Bromiley, 1991), strategic change (e.g., Park, 2007), and innovation (Greve, 
2003c). At the core of the theory is the aspiration level. For complex 
organizational actions—such as acquisitions—there are no universally-
accepted evaluation criteria. Constrained by bounded rationality, managers 
cannot use all available information in performance evaluation; hence they 
simplify the process by setting aspiration levels that reflect organizational 
goals and serve as a benchmark: performance that exceeds aspiration levels 
is viewed as a success, that which falls below is less favorably regarded 
(Cyert & March, 1963).
When performance falls short of aspiration levels, firms engage in 
problemistic search and are more willing to make organizational changes 
that are deemed risky (March & Shapira, 1987; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). 
Hence, performance below aspiration levels acts as a spur to organizational 
change as it encourages the exploration of alternative actions; when it 
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exceeds aspirations there is no need to change what appears to be the 
“right” strategy. Persisting with prior strategies is considered more efficient 
than trying new, unproven alternatives since it allows firms to capitalize on 
earlier investments in the requisite skills and techniques (Audia, Locke, & 
Smith, 2000; March, 1991). Thus the probability of (risky) organizational 
change declines when performance is above aspiration levels. A sizable body
of work has shown the link between strong performance and persistence 
with current strategy (Miller & Chen, 1994), just as poor performance has 
been found to prompt strategic changes, such as diversification (McDonald &
Westphal, 2003), changes to product format (Greve, 1998), and market 
positioning (Park, 2007).
In the acquisition context, when current acquisition performance falls 
below the level aspired to, the firm’s performance goals are not fulfilled; as 
the gap between the two widens so the tendency to regard acquisition 
strategy as suboptimal and poorly aligned with firm capabilities increases, 
prompting managers to engage in problemistic search for an alternative 
strategy. By contrast, when acquisition performance goes beyond 
aspirations, the belief that management got it “right” will be reinforced, 
encouraging them to favor the acquisition option in the future. In line with 
this logic, two prior studies have shown that firms modify their acquisition 
behavior in response to performance feedback. Iyer and Miller (2008) found 
that firms experiencing performance below aspirations are more likely to 
make acquisitions. Haleblian et al. (2006) found strong current acquisition 
10
performance increases the likelihood of making a future acquisition, although
their study did not use an aspiration level framework. Although the findings 
of these two studies may appear inconsistent—as the former found a 
negative relationship between performance and acquisition likelihood, while 
the latter found a positive one, they are not, in fact, inconsistent. Iyer and 
Miller (2008) study the effect of overall firm performance (return on assets) 
on acquisition likelihood, and they argue low firm performance will trigger a 
search for better business opportunities, which in turn results in changes in 
the corporate portfolio through increased acquisition activities. By contrast, 
Haleblian et al. (2006) examine acquisition-specific performance and posit 
that the low performance of a current acquisition will lead managers to 
search for a better strategic alternative, consequently decreasing acquisition
activities. Thus, the findings of these two studies are theoretically-consistent.
We adopt the approach used by Haleblian et al. (2006) and examine 
acquisition-specific performance rather than overall firm performance.
The focus on acquisition-specific performance offers an opportunity to 
contribute to theory on aspiration levels. Researchers tend to focus on the 
relationship between overall firm performance and firm behavior (e.g., Iyer &
Miller, 2008; Miller & Chen, 2004; Mishina et al., 2010), notably how overall 
firm performance below aspirations triggers problemistic search and 
increases organizational change and risk-taking, which forms the foundation 
of much empirical work. However, overall firm performance measures may 
be too general and far-removed from the vicinity of the problem in which 
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problemistic search occurs (Gavetti et al., 2012), hence our focus on the 
relationship between the performance of a specific action, i.e., acquisition, 
and the probability that it will be subsequently deployed (as opposed to the 
probability of broader organizational change), a linkage subject to 
considerably fewer confounding influences. This brings us closer to the 
actual causal mechanisms and organizational learning processes by which 
performance interpretation and managerial decisions are made. Building on 
these ideas, we propose the following baseline relationship between 
acquisition performance relative to aspiration levels and the probability of 
making a future acquisition:
Baseline proposition: There is a positive relationship between acquisition 
performance relative to aspiration levels and the probability of the firm 
making a subsequent acquisition.
We posit that the magnitude of this relationship will change according 
to whether performance is above or below the aspiration level, and that the 
pattern of results will differ depending on which aspiration level—historical or
social—is used to evaluate acquisition performance. While there is significant
evidence that the rate of organizational change increases when performance
falls below this level and slows when it rises above it (Audia et al., 2000; 
Greve, 1998; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992), whether and how historical 
versus social aspirational levels generate different influences on firm 
behavior remains unclear. The varying parameters model posits that decision
makers shift their attention between these two forms of aspiration levels 
(Bromiley & Harris, 2014; Washburn & Bromiley, 2012), which suggests 
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these aspiration levels are associated with different underlying cognitive and
organizational processes. Since the two are derived from distinct sources of 
performance feedback and are filtered through different cognitive and 
organizational processes, they may engender different interpretations, which
in turn may induce different organizational responses. Moreover, empirical 
findings on their respective influences are not always aligned. Several 
studies have found more significant effects for historical aspiration levels 
than for social aspirations (e.g., Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 2003b; Shipilov
et al., 2011) and vice versa (e.g., Harris & Bromiley, 2007). Supporting this 
view, Harris and Bromiley (2007: 362) suggested that firm responses to 
performance feedback may vary depending on the kind of reference point.
The Effects of Historical Aspirations on Acquisition Behavior
In the context of firm acquisitions, historical aspirations serve as a 
benchmark against which the performance of a new acquisition can be 
measured. The comparison of current performance with historical aspirations
is a useful learning mechanism that allows managers to incorporate evolving
realities into their evaluation, as well as to update existing assumptions with 
regard to their own effectiveness (Levinthal & March, 1981). Since historical 
aspiration levels are derived from past performance, they closely reflect the 
managerial capabilities and resources a firm brings to an acquisition—for 
example, target selection, price negotiation and due diligence—that may 
determine subsequent acquisition performance. All things being equal, it is 
reasonable to assume that acquirers with a strong performance track record 
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are more capable, and that the historical aspiration level of an acquirer is a 
reasonable proxy for the capabilities and resources it can deploy in future 
acquisitions. Furthermore, historical performance is subject to greater 
scrutiny because managers have access to private knowledge that resides 
within the firm and they may use such knowledge to interpret historical 
performance and identify factors contributing to the performance outcomes 
experienced (Menon & Pfeffer, 2003). These factors make the historical 
aspiration level a relatively credible predictor of how well they could perform 
given their resources and capabilities (Greve, 2003a: 42).
These features of historical performance information affect the way 
managers evaluate performance above and below historical aspiration 
levels. When a recent acquisition performs above the historical level, they 
may attribute this to their acquisition capabilities and assume they are on 
track to becoming more capable acquirers. However, it also creates an 
interesting paradox: while an acquisition may present a major strategic 
opportunity for the acquiring firms, it also carries significant risk (Pablo, 
Sitkin, & Jemison, 1996). Indeed research suggests that acquisitions are 
more likely to destroy value rather than creating value for the acquirer (King 
et al., 2004). Since acquisition is a risky strategy, managers contemplating a 
future acquisition decision in light of strong acquisition performance must 
reconcile countervailing forces—namely momentum versus caution. On the 
one hand, performance that exceeds historical aspirations will encourage 
more frequent acquisitions by convincing them that they are on the right 
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track, thereby fostering a desire to keep the performance momentum going 
by pursuing further acquisition opportunities. On the other hand, if the prior 
acquisition has done well, performance expectations for future acquisitions 
will be raised, making them increasingly difficult to meet (or exceed), 
thereby underlining the need for caution as the risk of being unable to meet 
the level of expectation of stakeholders increase.
Given that the historical aspiration level is perceived as an indicator of 
acquisition capability, performance that far exceeds historical aspiration 
levels may be seen as an outcome that will be difficult to replicate in the 
future. Thus there is a heightened risk of being unable to maintain the 
desired level of performance as well as greater pressure to make subsequent
acquisitions work. While managers are likely to persist in making acquisitions
in light of strong performance, in response to heightened aspirations they 
will be more cautious, only pursuing selective targets that are likely to 
perform above the established benchmark. Managers will also conduct due 
diligence to ensure the transaction’s efficiency and commit more time and 
resources to the post-acquisition integration of recently completed 
acquisitions before making their next move. These factors will lengthen the 
intervals between deals. In sum, when acquisition performance exceeds 
historical aspirations, the balance between momentum and caution will tilt in
favor of the latter, creating a deterrent to subsequent deals and slowing 
future acquisition activity. This will dampen the positive relationship posited 
in our baseline proposition.
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By contrast, an acquisition performance below historical aspiration 
levels suggests managers are unable to achieve what they could have been 
normally able to. A recent acquisition that performed below that level will 
result in a downward adjustment of the estimation of the firm’s acquisition 
capability. However, the updated capability estimation will still be higher 
than the recent acquisition performance level alone indicates. This upward 
capability estimation may prompt managers to believe that the performance 
of their next acquisition will improve to the level that they perceive to be 
normal. Moreover, because poor acquisition performance will lower the 
acquirer’s historical aspiration level, it will reduce the risk of failing to meet 
the adjusted aspiration level for subsequent acquisitions. Thus compared to 
when acquisition performance is above historical aspirations, managers will 
feel less compelled to exercise caution in making the next acquisition, and 
the balance between momentum and caution will tilt to momentum, thereby 
strengthening the positive relationship between acquisition performance 
relative to historical aspirations and the probability of making further 
acquisitions.
Taken together, we propose that the positive relationship between 
acquisition performance relative to historical aspiration levels and the 
probability of a subsequent acquisition will be weaker when acquisition 
performance exceeds historical aspiration levels than when it falls below. 
This logic leads to our first hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: The positive relationship between acquisition performance 
relative to the historical aspiration level and the probability of making a 
subsequent acquisition is weaker when a firm’s acquisition performance is 
above its historical aspiration level than when it is below its historical 
aspiration level.
Effects of Social Aspirations on Acquisition Behavior
Driven by the necessity of benchmarking, firms frequently set their 
own performance goals by observing the performance of a reference group 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995). Other comparable firms taking on similar 
strategic actions become particularly useful reference points for managers to
evaluate the effectiveness of their own strategies (Fiegenbaum, Hart, & 
Schendel, 1996), and hence their social aspiration levels. A performance 
above the level exhibited by members of the reference group is viewed as a 
success, whereas one which fails to attain the norm is regarded less 
favorably. Thus social aspiration levels help decision makers assess how well
they should perform since stakeholders will expect the firm to perform at 
least on a par with other firms in the reference group. In line with this logic, 
recent work on aspirations implies that managers first focus on social 
aspirations as this constitutes the baseline performance level (“how well 
they should perform”) before they attend to other performance benchmarks 
(Audia & Brion, 2007; Washburn & Bromiley, 2012).
While the social aspiration level is a useful performance benchmark, it 
is not always easy to interpret performance using social aspirations because 
learning from the experience of others—including the performance 
experienced by others—is inherently more difficult than learning from one’s 
17
own (Baum & Ingram, 2002). To interpret the performance of acquisitions 
made by other firms, managers not only need to know how well other firms 
performed, but also how other firms achieved the observed performance. 
Unfortunately, managers normally do not have access to the information 
required to accurately interpret other firms’ performance as such information
is often private knowledge available only to the insiders of the firms (Kim & 
Miner, 2007; Menon & Pfeffer, 2003). Reflecting these difficulties of learning 
from others, Baum and Ingram (2002) noted: “It is not surprising that 
knowledge does not transfer easily between organizations in the ‘open 
market’ as the difficulties in measuring and valuing knowledge are obvious.” 
Hence interpreting performance data from acquisitions made by others is 
more difficult than understanding the performance pattern of one’s own 
acquisitions.
When acquisition performance is above the social aspiration level, 
managers should first seek to understand why their firm performed better 
than others to inform their future acquisition behavior. If they conclude that 
they are a more capable acquirer, they are likely to pursue more acquisitions
to take advantage of their superior acquisition capability. If they believe their
success was an artifact of exogenous factors or a random luck, acquisitions 
will be no more attractive than other strategic options. However, the 
ambiguity and paucity of information on other firms present several 
challenges to managers trying to make sense of their success using social 
comparison. To credit high performance to their superior capabilities, they 
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must compare them with those of other acquirers. However, heterogeneity 
among firms in the reference group is often unobserved or inaccurately 
assessed, and a meaningful reference group may not necessarily exist 
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Denrell, Arvidsson, & Zander, 2004; McEvily &
Zaheer, 1999), making such comparisons extremely challenging. In the 
absence of comprehensive information on the firm’s capabilities vis à vis its 
peers, relative capabilities need to be construed since they cannot be 
accurately assessed and compared. Moreover, managers may not be aware 
of the potential sources of biases and error in the performance they observe 
(Bazerman & Moore, 2008). For example, they may fail to take into account 
the effects of hard-to-observe factors such as tacit knowledge or intangible 
assets in interpreting the performance of others. Also, managers tend to 
focus only on assessments of other firms’ recent performance due to the 
difficulty of observing the longitudinal pattern of others’ performance, which 
may not only be a more accurate gauge but also better reflect underlying 
contributory factors. Hence the social aspiration level is an ambiguous 
performance benchmark.
Due to the high ambiguity, social comparisons offer little information 
about how current acquisition performance matches their capabilities, or 
how their capabilities compare to those of other firms being benchmarked. In
the absence of a clear causal linkage between capabilities and performance, 
managers are more likely to focus on the outcomes themselves in making 
sense of the performance rather than the processes or antecedents that led 
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to those outcomes (Conell & Cohn, 1995; Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999). 
External information tends to be taken at face value because it is scarce and 
hard to interpret (Menon & Pfeffer, 2003). As a result, when managers 
vicariously learn from outcomes, they rarely consider whether they have the 
ability to replicate the observed outcomes, and they have a natural tendency
to underestimate how difficult it is to achieve the observed outcomes. 
Further, in assessing relative competencies, individuals tend to ignore 
competitors’ competencies (Eiser, Pahl, & Prins, 2001; Epley & Dunning, 
2000; Klar & Giladi, 1999). Research on information processing has similarly 
proposed that individuals are less attentive to external information cues, 
including the efforts and abilities of relevant others, which leads to the 
overestimation of their own relative efforts and abilities (Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993; Powell, Lovallo, & Caringal, 2006). There is also significant 
evidence that ambiguous performance assessment situations amplify the 
tendency to overestimate one’s own capabilities (e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz, 
& Holzberg, 1989; Van Yperen, 1992).
Acquisition performance above social aspirations sends a signal to 
managers that they are performing better than what they should. Given the 
ambiguity associated with social comparisons, managers are more likely to 
credit the strong performance to their own capabilities and less likely to 
doubt their ability to perform at the same level on future acquisitions. 
Performance that significantly exceeds their social aspiration level will 
further validate their belief in their superiority unlike performance that far 
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exceeds their historical aspiration level. Consequently, when acquisition 
performance is above the social aspiration level, the balance between the 
two countervailing forces—momentum and caution—will tilt towards 
momentum, amplifying the positive relationship between acquisition 
performance relative to social aspirations and the probability of making a 
subsequent acquisition.
By contrast, failing to meet the social aspiration level will substantially 
increase pressure from stakeholders because they are not performing as well
as they should. Managers are expected to maintain a performance level on a
par with competitors. Thus a performance below social aspirations will 
increase the pressure for managers to perform better than the competition 
in subsequent acquisitions as stakeholders may not tolerate another incident
of below-average performance. Additionally, unlike a performance above 
social aspirations, it is unlikely to instill overconfidence or overestimation of 
abilities in managers.
Further, the ambiguity associated with performance assessment using 
social aspirations often masks the causes of the poor performance of the 
current acquisition, making it difficult for managers to identify ways to 
improve performance in the future. Strong pressure to improve performance,
in combination with the ambiguous nature of social comparison, will increase
uncertainty about the prospect of improving performance in the subsequent 
acquisition, which in turn will prompt managers to exercise caution in 
undertaking a risky strategic move such as acquisition. Indeed, prior work on
21
risk-taking has shown that individuals become risk-averse in situations in 
which the cause-effect relationship is unclear or there is a high degree of 
uncertainty (March & Shapira, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Thus 
compared to when acquisition performance is above social aspirations, 
managers will be more cautious about making the next acquisition when 
acquisition performance is below social aspirations, tilting the balance 
between momentum and caution toward caution. These arguments lead to 
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between acquisition performance 
relative to the social aspiration level and the probability of making a 
subsequent acquisition is stronger when a firm’s acquisition performance is 
above its social aspiration level than when it is below its social aspiration 
level.
Moderating Effects of Acquisition Performance Variability
While interpreting the behavioral implications of aspiration levels is a 
core idea in performance feedback research, without taking into 
consideration the stability of past performance such predictions are 
necessarily constrained. For example, although acquisition performance that 
far exceeds a firm’s aspiration level will be seen as a success, it may be an 
unreliable indicator that the firm is a capable acquirer if it has experienced 
high performance variability in past acquisitions. Thus, without taking into 
account past performance variability one cannot accurately assess whether 
or not a firm’s current performance is an accurate reflection of its 
capabilities or whether it is sustainable in the future (Denrell, 2005). To 
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understand how managers interpret performance relative to aspiration levels
the role of prior performance variability must be considered.
As performance variability increases, the less reliable the performance 
signal becomes. Given high variability, managers will have difficulty 
assessing whether a strong acquisition performance can be reliably 
replicated in future acquisitions (or, conversely, whether a poor acquisition 
performance will recur in future acquisitions). Thus high performance 
variability makes a firm’s prior performance history an unreliable indicator at
best, reducing its informational value for predicting how well it will perform 
in the future. The unreliability associated with high performance variability 
makes decision makers less confident in their performance interpretation. 
We posit that the way in which managers interpret current performance 
relative to aspirations depends on the variability in their prior acquisition 
performance.
Consider what acquisition performance above aspiration levels actually
means when performance variability is high. Managers in such a situation 
may be less certain about the sustainability of superior acquisition 
performance: Was it due to compelling strategic capabilities and therefore 
sustainable? Or was it a “false positive” and therefore unsustainable? 
Confronted with high performance variability, they may have difficulty 
believing they have suddenly mastered the complex set of skills necessary 
for consistently strong acquisition performance, and may well wonder 
whether positive performance is sustainable in future acquisitions (Denrell et
23
al., 2004). Thus high performance variability lowers their confidence that 
they can reliably replicate the same level of performance in future 
acquisitions. Held in check by the realization that performance may not be 
sustainable given their track record, they will be more cautious about making
future acquisitions and may reduce the pace at which future acquisitions are 
made.
By contrast, low acquisition performance variability suggests that a 
subsequent acquisition will not deviate from the strong performance of the 
current acquisition, and therefore managers will be less susceptible to 
doubting their ability to maintain strong performance in future acquisitions 
(since it implies higher reliability in performance assessment). It will validate 
their belief that they are developing the skills and capabilities to be more 
effective acquirers, thereby encouraging them to make further acquisitions.
While high performance variability attenuates the relationship between
performance and acquisition persistence above aspirations, it will intensify 
the relationship below aspirations. Managers—like any other individuals—
tend to see themselves in a positive light, especially in performance 
assessment situations (Pfeffer et al., 1998). This tendency, known as “self-
enhancement motives” in social psychology, refers to the individual’s need 
to maintain a positive self-image (Fiske, 2004). Thus, managers favor a 
performance indicator that allows them to view the firm in a more positive 
light, while disregarding more negative evaluations (Audia & Brion, 2007). In 
a recent theory paper, Jordan and Audia (2012) posit that self-enhancement 
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is more strongly manifested when individuals experience performance below 
aspirations because there is a much greater need for self-enhancement in 
poor performance situations. Hence, if recent performance falls below 
aspirations, managers with high performance variability will regard it less as 
an indicator of true ability than of random noise—or as a ‘false negative’ as 
they will favor the upper, more positive, bound of their performance 
variability as an indicator of their capability. As such, when firms with high 
acquisition performance variability achieve low performance on a current 
acquisition, they will be inclined to believe that they can achieve higher 
performance with a subsequent acquisition. Hence, compared to firms with 
low performance variability, they are more likely to persist in making 
acquisitions when performance falls below aspiration levels, as they expect 
future acquisition performance to improve.
However, low performance variability may convey a different signal to 
firms experiencing performance below aspiration levels. A performance 
below aspirations will lower their capability estimation; firms with low 
performance variability are more likely to view the adjusted (lowered) 
capability estimation as a credible indicator of future acquisition 
performance. Low variability signifies that the firm has little chance to 
improve its performance dramatically in its next acquisition, since low 
performance variability implies that acquisition capabilities are fixed. Since 
they perceive a greater risk that a subsequent acquisition will suffer from 
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poor performance, they will be less motivated to make future acquisitions 
than the firms with high performance variability.
In sum, high performance variability sends a mixed signal: When a firm
performs above aspirations, managers are less convinced they can replicate 
the same level of performance in the future1; whereas when a firm performs 
below aspirations, they convince themselves that performance can improve 
in the future. By contrast, low performance variability is equated with a 
stable (or fixed) ability, increasing their confidence that a firm’s performance
above aspirations can be replicated in subsequent acquisitions, while casting
doubt on the possibility that a firm that performs below aspirations can 
dramatically improve performance in future acquisitions. Thus we predict 
differential moderating effects of performance variability above and below 
aspiration levels, but we do not predict differential moderating effects for 
historical and social aspiration levels because there is no theoretical reason 
that suggests performance variability will influence the interpretation of past 
performance differently when different types of aspiration levels are used. 
These arguments lead to the following set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: When a firm’s acquisition performance is below its aspiration 
level, the positive relationship between acquisition performance relative to 
the aspiration level and the probability of making a subsequent acquisition is
stronger for the firms with high variability in acquisition performance than for
those with low variability in acquisition performance.
1 Acquisition performance above aspirations will be viewed as success by any firm, and 
managers of a firm that experienced such performance are likely to attribute their success 
to their superior capabilities. This attribution process will be in place for both high and low 
performance variability firms. We are proposing here that high performance variability will 
“weaken” such attribution when performance is above aspiration while low performance 
variability will “strengthen” it.
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Hypothesis 3b: When a firm’s acquisition performance is above its aspiration 
level, the positive relationship between acquisition performance relative to 
the aspiration level and the probability of making a subsequent acquisition is
weaker for the firms with high variability in acquisition performance than for 
those with low variability in acquisition performance.
METHOD
Sample and Data
We tested our hypotheses using data drawn from the U.S. commercial 
banking institutions during the 18-year period between 1988 and 2005. The 
initial sample included all horizontal acquisitions made by all publicly traded 
commercial banking institutions, including banks, thrifts (i.e., savings and 
loan associations and savings banks), and bank holding companies. The final 
sample tracked 3,010 acquisitions made by 642 publicly-traded banks.2 We 
transformed these acquisition data into event history data format using 
annual financial and organizational data, which resulted in 8,799 yearly 
spells. When a bank made an acquisition, it enters the sample and becomes 
at risk of making a subsequent acquisition. Among the 642 banks included in
the sample, 220 banks either exited the sample due to closure (failure or 
acquisition) or were right-censored without making another acquisition until 
the end of the study period.
One empirical challenge in our study is to measure acquisition 
performance relative to the historical aspiration level and the variability in 
2 An earlier study by Haleblian et al. (2006) also used the acquisition data from U.S. 
commercial banking industry during the period between 1988 and 2001, which included 
2,523 acquisitions made by 579 banks. The sample used in this study includes four more 
years of data (2002-2005), and it was not built on the sample used in the prior study; 
instead we built the sample from scratch by collecting and reconstructing all the data.
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acquisition performance. Because calculating these variables requires two or
more acquisitions, we cannot construct them unless a bank made at least 
two acquisitions during the study period. A simple solution is to drop the 
banks that made only one acquisition from the sample, but this could 
introduce a sampling bias. A better analytic approach is to employ 
Heckman’s two-stage sample selection model (Heckman, 1979). 
Unfortunately, this technique is not suitable for our sample. The purpose of 
the first stage of Heckman’s selection model is to generate the inverse Mills 
ratios that control for the likelihood that the banks in the full sample make a 
second acquisition. However, Heckman’s selection model does not 
distinguish the second acquisition from all other subsequent acquisitions (the
third acquisition and beyond); instead it calculates the inverse Mills ratios as 
if all the acquisitions in the data were the second one. Because acquisitions 
are repeatable events and many banks in our sample made more than two 
acquisitions, this procedure will generate inaccurate, or even biased, inverse 
Mills ratios. Thus they are inaccurate and may not effectively control for the 
potential sampling bias.
Hence we adopted an alternative approach. If banks have not made 
any acquisition in the past, their historical aspiration level will be neither 
positive nor negative. It is reasonable, then, to assume that these banks will 
have a neutral, or zero, historical aspiration level when they do not have 
prior performance records. Hence, we set the historical aspiration of the 
banks in the sample to zero when they enter the dataset. Similarly, we set 
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the variability in acquisition performance to zero when the banks have no 
prior acquisition records. This approach not only helps us avoid the potential 
sampling bias issue but also allows us to utilize all the available data. Thus 
we present the results obtained from the models based on this approach. To 
check the robustness of our results, we also tested our hypotheses using 
Heckman’s selection model and obtained consistent results.3
The data on acquisitions were obtained from SNL Financial 
Corporation, a database company that maintains comprehensive M&A data 
on U.S. financial service firms. Stock market data used to calculate 
acquisition performance were collected from the Center for Research in 
Securities Pricing. Firm level financial and demographic data were drawn 
from the banking module of the SNL database and the regulatory databases 
from the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The U.S. commercial banking industry is an ideal context in which to 
investigate our research questions. The industry is populated with relatively 
homogeneous firms that share similar organizational and operational 
characteristics, which implicitly controls for unobserved firm-level factors 
contributing to acquisition behavior that may be present in more 
heterogeneous populations. More importantly, the vast majority of targets 
acquired by banks during the study period were other commercial banking 
institutions due to the regulation that prohibits banks from acquiring non-
3 For the reason discussed earlier, the inverse Mills ratios obtained from the first stage of the
selection model are potentially biased; hence the results should be interpreted with caution.
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financial institutions. Our research questions require us to identify patterns 
of performance of acquisitions in the sample. Because acquisitions in 
different industries may result in systematically different performance levels 
and performance expectations, tracking the performance of prior 
acquisitions with targets from multiple industries makes it difficult to build 
empirical models that are consistent with our theories by introducing a 
significant level of complexity into the interpretation of prior acquisition 
performance. For example, investors’ expectations of returns from an 
acquisition in a high-technology industry (e.g., biotechnology) are likely to be
different from those they would expect from a more traditional industry (e.g.,
retail) because of the substantial differences in their respective motivations 
for making acquisitions, the structure of the industry, and the nature of 
competition. Thus in order to test our research questions, it is best to study 
only the horizontal acquisitions in which targets are all from the same 
industry. However, it is possible that a firm’s aspiration may be influenced by
prior acquisitions in other industries. Thus by studying only horizontal 
acquisitions, we run a risk of underestimating the influence of acquisitions in 
other industries. However, this risk is practically non-existent in the banking 
industry because the vast majority of the acquisitions in this industry are 
horizontal acquisitions (Kim & Finkelstein, 2009).
In addition, the acquisition outlook of the U.S. commercial banks 
changed dramatically in the late 1980s due to a series of regulatory changes
implemented during the period such as the Competitive Equality Banking Act
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of 1987, which virtually removed regulatory restrictions on interstate bank 
acquisitions. This discontinuity in the acquisition environment in the U.S. 
banking industry led to substantial changes in acquisition strategies of 
banks. This event is especially helpful for the design of our study because it 
reduces (and even eliminates) potential biases that may arise from studying 
only a partial acquisition history of the banks in our sample.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of this study is the hazard rate of a firm in the 
sample making a subsequent acquisition following the focal acquisition. The 
hazard rate of making an acquisition is defined as:
r (t )=lim
t '→0
[
Pr  (t , t
'
t
)
t '
¿] ,¿
where Pr(t, t´/t) is the probability of a bank in the sample making
an acquisition in the time period, t, t´.
The dependent variable in event history analysis has two parts. The 
first part is the event indicator that specifies whether a bank in the sample 
made an acquisition. The event indicator was coded 1 if a bank made an 
acquisition during a given spell and 0 otherwise. Event history analysis also 
requires a measure of time at risk of the event (acquisitions) because it 
takes into account not only whether a bank in the sample made an 
acquisition but also the time the bank takes to make the acquisition 
(frequently called the duration). Our data were transformed into yearly spells
to incorporate the duration information.
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Independent and Moderating Variables
Acquisition performance: Acquirer market returns. We measure 
acquisition performance based on the stock market response using the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Although the CAR is the most frequently 
used analytic approach for measuring acquisition performance in prior 
research in strategy (e.g., Capron & Pistre, 2002; Hayward, 2002) and 
finance (e.g., Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992; Mitchell & Lehn, 1990), it is a 
measure of expected rather than realized performance gains (Zollo & Meier, 
2008). We subscribe to the view that the CAR is not an ideal measure of 
acquisition performance if the construct is used to capture the actual value 
created by an acquisition. However, we are not interested in assessing post-
acquisition performance; instead we seek to explore how managers interpret
and respond to performance feedback from an acquisition. Thus our 
acquisition performance measure should signify a crucial acquisition 
outcome that managers pay attention to and take into consideration when 
making acquisition decisions, but it does not need to capture realized gains 
(or losses) of an acquisition. We call this variable Acquirer Market Returns to 
accurately reflect the construct it captures.4
The abnormal return on a security of a firm represents the part of the 
return on the security that is unanticipated by an economic model of 
expected returns for the same security. The CAR is the sum of daily 
abnormal returns for a security over a period that indicates the persistence 
4 It is more accurate to call this variable Acquirer Announcement Market Returns, but we call
it Acquirer Market Returns for simplicity.
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of the impact of the event during that period. Specifically, we assessed 
returns of the security of a bank in our sample against the return of the 
market portfolio:
CARi (T 1 ,T 2)=∑
t=T 1
T2
{Rit−(α i+β i Rmt ) },
where Rit = the return on stock i for day t, Rmt = the return on the
market portfolio for day t; αi = a constant, βi = beta of stock i, 
and T1 and T2 are the lower and upper limits of the event window,
respectively.
We computed the CAR from one trading days before to one trading 
days after the announcement of an acquisition (-1, +1), an oft-used event 
window in the acquisition literature (Rhoades, 1994). We then tested the 
sensitivity of the results by estimating the models using other frequently 
used event windows [i.e., (-3, 3), (-5, 5)] and found consistent results. We 
use a short event window for two reasons: (1) the largest stock price 
movement in response to an acquisition announcement usually observed 
during the first day after the announcement; and (2) managers who are 
boundedly rational may focus on the most dramatic stock price change 
rather than tracking the stock price change over a longer time frame.
Two considerations make the CAR an appropriate measure for this 
study. First, the stock market reaction to an acquisition is often the primary 
basis for evaluating the managers involved in a deal because the outcomes 
of an acquisition can only be observed after considerable time has elapsed 
(Rhoades, 1994). Because managers are often rewarded (or punished) based
on changes in the stock value (Hall & Liebman, 1998; Warner, Watts, & 
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Wruck, 1988), how the market responds to prior acquisitions—whether or not
such responses accurately reflect the value of the acquisition—is important 
for their career and compensation, and is likely to influence their future 
acquisition decisions. To assess whether managers pay attention to the stock
market reaction, we conducted unstructured interviews with two managers 
with extensive acquisition experience and two acquisition specialists. The 
anecdotal evidence obtained from these interviews supported the notion that
managers consider stock market reaction to be an important aspect of 
acquisition performance and attend to this information when they make 
acquisition decisions. A quote from an interviewee indicates that managers 
may engage in an in-depth analysis of their stock price changes after an 
acquisition: “After each acquisition, we undertake a comprehensive financial 
review that includes an analysis of the gains and losses on our firm value. 
The report often becomes quite academic, and we look into many different 
ways to make sense of our stock price changes.” Another quote underscores 
the importance of stock market reaction in making acquisition decisions: 
“They [investment bankers] keep an eye on our stock price after we 
announce a deal. We once withdrew a bid because our stock didn’t fare 
well.”
Second, short-term changes in stock valuation are easy to attribute to 
the focal acquisition. Investors may eventually revise their initial estimates of
the impact of the acquisition; the acquirer may also keep making changes in 
strategy (both related to and unrelated to the acquisition); and its operating 
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environment may continue to evolve. These factors make it increasingly 
difficult for the acquirer to keep track of the causes of changes in financial 
figures and to attribute those changes to the acquisition. Thus short-term 
changes in the stock value become an attractive measure that boundedly 
rational managers use to make sense of the performance of an acquisition.
In sum, market-based feedback (i.e., stock price) is constantly updated
and it is considered significant by both inside managers and external 
observers (Zajac & Westphal, 2004). This is consistent with the behavioral 
theory of the firm, since we posit that managers make acquisition decisions 
based only on available data and do not assume long-term optimality of their
decisions.(Cyert & March, 1963). Although from prior research and much 
anecdotal evidence a general consensus has emerged that managers heed 
the changes in the value of their stock (Davis, 2009), there is still a debate 
about whether managers actually use CARs to evaluate the performance of 
their actions. Some researchers have found supporting evidence that 
managers use CARs to evaluate their strategy and change behavior (e.g., 
Kau, Linck, & Rubin, 2008; Luo, 2005), others did not reach the same 
conclusion (e.g., Jennings & Mazzeo, 1991). Therefore, the key question is 
whether managers calculate and use CARs rather than simply looking at the 
change in the stock price. Since this is largely an empirical question, we 
estimated models using alternative acquisition performance variables based 
on the percentage changes in the stock price one day before and after 
acquisition announcement (i.e., [Stock Pricet+1 – Stock Pricet-1]/Stock Pricet-1) 
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to check the robustness of our findings. We obtained consistent results from 
the models based on this alternative specification of acquisition 
performance.
Historical aspiration level. In previous work on aspiration levels, 
historical aspiration levels are generally measured by an exponentially 
weighted moving average of a firm’s performance history (Levinthal & 
March, 1981). We similarly measured historical aspiration levels by taking an
exponentially weighted moving average of the CARs of prior acquisitions:
Historical Aspirationi ,t=α∗Acquirer Market Returns i ,mr+(1−α )∗Historical Aspirationi ,t−1 ,
where Historical Aspirationi,t is the historical aspiration level of 
bank i at time t; Acquirer Market Returnsi,mr is the acquirer 
market returns of the most recent acquisition made by bank i 
prior to t; Historical Aspirationi,t-1 is the historical aspiration level 
of bank i before making the most recent acquisition; and  is the 
weight assigned to the most recent aspiration level and is set to 
0.3.
This equation describes an anchoring and adjustment process in which 
the acquirer market returns of the focal acquisition updates the last period’s 
aspiration level that is set by the acquirer market returns of all the 
acquisitions that a bank made prior to the focal acquisition. When we 
estimated models with different values of the weighting parameter, , a 
value of 0.3 provided the best model fit.
Testing Hypothesis 1 requires a measure of acquirer market returns 
relative to historical aspiration levels. We specified relative acquirer market 
returns using a spline function, which allows the variable coefficient to 
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change at a predetermined point (Marsh & Cormier, 2002). Specifically, we 
split the acquirer market returns into two variables: (1) Acquirer Market 
Returns below Historical Aspiration and (2) Acquirer Market Returns above 
Historical Aspiration. Acquirer Market Returns below Historical Aspiration is 
set to 0 when the acquirer market returns of the focal acquisition is above 
the historical aspiration level and equals the difference between the acquirer
market returns of the focal acquisition and the historical aspiration level 
when the acquirer market returns of the focal acquisition is below the 
historical aspiration level. Similarly, Acquirer Market Returns above Historical
Aspiration is set to 0 when the acquirer market returns of the focal 
acquisition is below the historical aspiration level and is equal to the 
difference between the acquirer market returns of the focal acquisition and 
the historical aspiration level when the acquirer market returns of the focal is
above the historical aspiration level. As discussed earlier, when a bank does 
not have a prior acquisition record (i.e., when banks enter the sample by 
making their first acquisition), we set their historical aspiration level to zero.
Social aspiration level. Because commercial banks generally 
compete with others that are geographically close, they are more likely to 
set their performance expectations on the basis of the performance 
outcomes of acquisitions made by others in the same geographic market in 
which their primary operation takes place or those proximate to their 
primary market. We used the states to meaningfully differentiate geographic
boundaries that managers attend to in their decision-making. States are a 
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natural candidate for measuring the boundary of social comparison in the 
banking industry since it remains very much a ‘local’ industry in which the 
majority of banks still operate in a single or a few neighboring states except 
for a handful of mega-banks. Even those that operate in multiple states tend 
to have a single core state market. Constrained by limited cognitive capacity,
bank managers are likely to rely on the information from the most important 
market when they set their social aspiration levels (Lant & Baum, 1995). 
Thus we identified the state that represents the most important market for 
the focal bank and used the state as the boundary of social comparison.5 We 
determined the importance of a state for a bank using the amount of 
deposits that the bank has in the state; specifically, a state is considered to 
be the core market for a bank if the bank derives the largest portion of its 
deposits from the state.
Thus we measured the social aspiration level by the average acquirer 
market returns of all acquisitions made by all other banks in the state in 
which the focal bank derives the largest amount of deposits during the year 
prior to the focal acquisition. To test Hypothesis 2, we created two variables 
of acquirer market returns relative to the social aspiration level using the 
same method used to create the relative performance measures for the 
historical aspiration level: (1) Acquirer Market Returns below Social 
Aspiration and (2) Acquirer Market Returns above Social Aspiration.
5 To test the sensitivity of our geographic grouping, we also estimated models using an 
alternative measure of the social aspiration level that is based on the twelve Federal 
Reserve Districts, and obtained consistent results.
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Variability in acquirer market returns. This variable captures the 
degree to which the acquirer market returns of a bank’s prior acquisitions 
varies. Acquirer Market Returns Variability was measured by the standard 
deviation of the acquirer market returns of all the acquisitions that a bank 
made prior to the focal acquisition since 1988. As noted, the study period 
commenced in 1988, corresponding to a major deregulation in the banking 
industry. This resulted in dramatic changes in the acquisition practices and 
strategies of banks and made their acquisition experience prior to these 
changes—including interpretations of past acquisition performance—much 
less valuable (Rhodes, 2000). This variable was measured as of 1988 to 
reflect this underlying change in the banking industry.6 As for the historical 
aspiration level, we set this variable to zero when a bank does not have any 
prior acquisition record.7
Control Variables
6 We also explored an alternative variable that was measured using all the acquisitions 
since 1978, the first year in which comprehensive data on bank acquisitions became 
available. This variable provided consistent results.
7 By setting Acquirer Market Returns Variability to zero for banks with no prior acquisitions, 
we are making an implicit assumption that such banks are more certain about their 
acquisition capabilities. This is not consistent with the notion that inexperienced acquirers 
may be more uncertain about their acquisition capabilities. We performed two sensitivity 
analyses to see if this assumption significantly affects our results. First, we estimated the 
models using a subsample of banks that made at least two acquisitions. This subsample 
allows us to calculate Acquirer Market Returns Variability without making this assumption. 
Second, we estimated the models using an alternative Acquirer Market Returns Variability 
variable based on an assumption that a bank with no prior acquisitions will set its Acquirer 
Market Returns Variability based on the industry average. Specifically, we use the average 
acquirer market returns of all the acquisitions made in the year in which the focal acquisition
was made instead of zero when a bank does not have any prior acquisition record. These 
sensitivity analyses provided highly consistent results.
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Based on a comprehensive review of the existing research on 
acquisitions, we included a set of control variables found to have effects 
upon acquisition likelihood.
Acquirer-level controls. Prior studies have shown that acquisition 
decisions are influenced by the characteristics of the acquirer (King et al., 
2004). Larger firms tend to be more acquisitive because they generally have 
more resources available for acquisitions and are more growth-oriented than 
smaller firms. They also tend to persist in their strategic actions because 
they are subject to stronger inertial forces. Hence, Acquirer Size, measured 
as the natural logarithm of an acquirer’s total loans, was included to control 
for the effects of firm size. A high level of slack resources may promote 
acquisition activity because it provides the financial resources required to 
make an acquisition and encourages managers to take risky strategic actions
such as acquisitions (March, 1981). Thus we controlled for Acquirer Slack 
Resources, measured as the ratio of an acquirer’s core deposits to the total 
assets of the acquirer.8 Firms with strong performance are more likely to 
pursue an acquisition because strong performance permits them to focus on 
growth and they can afford to finance costly acquisitions. Accordingly, 
Acquirer Firm Performance, which was measured using the acquirer’s return 
on equity, was included. Finally, because banks’ ability to efficiently procure 
financial resources can increase deal-making, we controlled for Acquirer Cost
8 Core deposit is the amount of a bank’s deposits that is expected to stay on the bank’s 
balance sheet. Core deposit is a good indicator of a bank’s potential cash outflow and level 
of liquid assets, and is considered to be a more accurate indicator of slack resources than 
cash for commercial banks. We also used liquid assets to measure this variable and found 
consistent results.
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of Fund, which we measured as total interest expense divided by interest-
bearing liabilities. A low Acquirer Cost of Fund indicates that an acquirer pays
low interest on its borrowing and could finance an acquisition at a low cost.
Acquisition-level controls. The characteristics of the focal 
acquisition itself may influence a firm’s future acquisition decisions. First, the
relative sizes of the target and the acquirer can affect the likelihood of future
acquisitions (Amburgey & Miner, 1992); thus we included Relative Acquisition
Size as the ratio of target deposits to acquirer deposits. Second, the type of 
consideration used to finance an acquisition implicitly indicates how 
managers assess the value of their stock; if managers believe that the stock 
is overvalued relative to the market, they may be driven to make 
acquisitions to take advantage of the high stock price. Thus we included 
Stock Consideration, which was coded 1 if an acquirer used stock to finance 
the focal deal and 0 otherwise. Acquiring and integrating a target that is 
equal or larger in size exhausts the acquirer’s financial and managerial 
resources and may become a source of organizational conflicts, 
consequently putting a brake on future acquisition activities. We included 
Merger of Equals to control for this potential effect (coded 1 if the focal 
acquisition is a merger of equals and 0 otherwise). We also controlled for 
Lock-up Agreement—a legal contract that prohibits insiders from selling their
stock for a specified period of time after an acquisition—since insiders who 
cannot profit from their stock may try to find a way to utilize their locked-up 
equity by making more acquisitions. This variable is coded 1 if the focal 
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acquisition deal had a lock-up agreement clause in place and 0 otherwise. 
Because our sample included only horizontal acquisitions within one 
industry, there is no need to control for the relatedness between the merging
firms.
Industry-level controls. The overall acquisition trend and climate at 
the industry level may affect an acquirer’s subsequent acquisition behavior 
(Bergh, 1997). For instance, a large number of acquisitions within an industry
—or ‘acquisition wave’—may trigger herd behavior. We include two control 
variables to control for industry-level acquisition activity: (1) the total 
number (Regional Acquisition Density) and the total dollar value (Regional 
Total Acquisition Value) of all acquisitions completed each year in the 
Federal Reserve district in which an acquirer is located. Additionally, a large 
number of banks increase not only the level of industry competition but also 
the number of potential takeover targets; both of these factors will promote 
acquisition activities as banks search for ways to reduce competition. Thus 
we included Number of Banks, measured as the number of banks in the state
in which the focal bank’s core market is located. The acquisition activity in a 
market will be reduced if the market is highly concentrated while the 
opposite is true if the market is highly fragmented. To control for this 
potential effect, we added Bank Concentration, which was measured as the 
Herfindahl index of the market share of the banks in the state (the amount of
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a bank’s deposits as a percentage of the amount of the total deposits of all 
the banks in the state).9
Acquirer prior acquisition record. Research has found that 
acquisition experience influences future acquisition behavior (Amburgey & 
Miner, 1992); hence we controlled for Prior Acquisition Experience, measured
as the total number of acquisitions made by a bank up to the year prior to 
the focal acquisition since 1988. Acquirers with a strong acquisition 
performance history will gain confidence in their talent for making successful
acquisitions, encouraging them to make further acquisitions. Thus we 
controlled for a bank’s average acquirer market returns on its prior 
acquisitions by including Prior Average Acquirer Market Returns, 
operationalized as the average acquirer market returns of all prior 
acquisitions made by the bank. Banks that have been consistently 
acquisitive may be more prone to make another acquisition in the near 
future. We control for this potential effect by including Acquisition Speed, 
which was measured as the average number of acquisitions undertaken each
year by the focal bank.
Indicator variables for modeling. As discussed in the sample 
section, we set the historical aspiration level and acquirer market returns 
variability to zero for the first acquisition that banks in our sample made 
9 We measure the acquisition trend variables (Regional Acquisition Density and Regional 
Total Acquisition Value) at the Federal Reserve district level instead of at the state-level 
because the states may be too narrow a geographic boundary to capture the overall 
acquisition trend and climate. However, we measured the industry environment variables at 
the state level because the state is a better geographic boundary to identify the banking 
conditions, especially competition. We estimated models using alternative control variables 
that were measured all at the state-level and obtained consistent results.
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because they have no prior acquisition record when they made their first 
acquisition. To control for the possibility that these observations 
systematically influence our model estimation, we included First Acquisition 
Indictor, which is coded 1 for the observations based on the first acquisition 
record and 0 otherwise. There are occasions when the acquirer market 
returns of the focal acquisition are not consistently above or below both 
aspiration levels. To control for the effect of acquirer market returns above 
one aspiration level but below the other, we included Aspiration 
Inconsistency, which is set to 0 if the acquirer market returns is below or 
above both aspiration levels and is set to the difference between the 
acquirer market returns and higher aspiration level if the acquirer market 
returns is between the two aspiration levels (Greve, 1998). This variable 
shows how the inconsistency between the two aspiration levels shifts the 
effects of the performance relative to aspiration levels on making 
subsequent acquisitions. Lastly, we included Year Dummy Variables to the 
models to control for the effects of time periods.
Analysis
We estimate our models using event history analysis. Acquisition is 
treated as a repeatable event because firms in the sample can make 
multiple acquisitions during the period. Event history analysis offers the most
comprehensive, dynamic picture of behavioral changes by considering the 
time between acquisitions (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). Further, the 
presence of right-censored observations may introduce an estimation bias if 
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an improper analytical technique is used. The event history analysis takes 
into account right-censored observations and provides unbiased estimates 
(Blossfeld, Golsch, & Rohwer, 2007).
We employ a piecewise exponential model, which splits the time axis 
into predefined time periods; hazard rates are constant in each of these time
periods but can vary in an unconstrained way between them. Given l time 
periods ( Ik ={t|τk≤t≤τk +1} , k = 1…l), the hazard rate of the piecewise 
exponential model from the initial state i to destination state j can be 
represented as (Blossfeld et al., 2007):
r ij (t )=e
αk
−ij
eβ
ij χij if t ∈Ik ,
where, for each transition (i, j), αk−ij  is a constant coefficient 
associated with the kth time period, βij is a row vector of 
covariates, and χ ij  is an associated vector of coefficients that 
were assumed not to vary across time periods.
Parametric estimates of hazard rates involve assumptions about how 
time affects the occurrence of the events of interest, hence selecting an 
appropriate functional specification for duration dependence is of great 
importance. The piecewise exponential model is frequently used in 
organization studies because it provides a more accurate picture of duration 
dependence by allowing a flexible estimation of hazard rates of making 
acquisitions (e.g., Ingram & Baum, 1997; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). We also 
estimated models with other parametric specifications to test the robustness
of our results (i.e., Exponential and Gompertz) and found converging 
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evidence, suggesting that the results were not the artifact of the type of 
parametric specification.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix 
for all study variables. We found no evidence of multicollinearity in our 
models because we could not detect any coefficient instability among the 
research variables when variables were added individually and hierarchically 
(Greenberg & Parks, 1997; Kennedy, 2003). To further assess the potential 
model estimation issues that may be introduced by multicollinearity, we 
calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs). The VIFs for most variables in 
Model 2 are well below 10, a common rule of thumb used to detect potential 
multicollinearity problems (Hardin, 1996), ranging from 1.09 to 2.14. 
However, two variables, Prior Acquisition Experience and Acquisition Speed, 
have high VIF values (12.61 and 13.20 respectively) because they are highly 
correlated. We included both variables because they capture different 
theoretical constructs. The results on our key findings are not affected when 
we dropped either one of the variables.
 Insert Tables 1 about here ── ──
Table 2 reports maximum-likelihood estimates from the piecewise 
exponential models predicting subsequent acquisition rates. Model 1 reports 
only the control variables. The main research variables were added to 
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Models 2. Model 2A is the same as Model 2, but in Model 2A we use relative 
acquirer market returns variables based on an alternative specification of 
spline functions (marginal splines) to test whether the coefficient changes 
below and above the aspiration levels are statistically significant. The 
interactions between Acquirer Market Returns below/above Historical 
Aspiration and Acquirer Market Returns Variability were added to Model 3. 
Model 4 added the interactions between Acquirer Market Returns 
below/above Social Aspiration and Acquirer Market Returns Variability. Model
5 is a fully-saturated model with all the variables and interactions. The 
addition of each set of variables significantly improved the goodness of fit of 
each model.
 Insert Tables 2 about here ── ──
Our baseline proposition predicts a positive relationship between a 
firm’s acquirer market returns relative to the aspiration levels and the 
probability that the firm will make a subsequent acquisition. The coefficients 
for both Acquirer Market Returns below Historical Aspiration and Acquirer 
Market Returns above Historical Aspiration are positive and statistically 
significant in all models, indicating that the higher the acquirer market 
returns relative to the historical aspiration level, the higher the probability 
that a bank in the sample will make a subsequent acquisition. Similarly, the 
coefficients for both Acquirer Market Returns below Social Aspiration and 
Acquirer Market Returns above Social Aspiration are positive and statistically 
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significant in all models. These results are consistent with our baseline 
proposition.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the positive relationship between 
acquisition performance (acquirer market returns) relative to historical 
aspiration and the probability of making a subsequent acquisition is stronger 
when the performance of the focal acquisition remains below the historical 
aspiration level than when it rises above this level. Model 2 shows that the 
slope of the regression line for Acquirer Market Returns below Historical 
Aspiration is greater (7.474) than the slope for Acquirer Market Returns 
above Historical Aspiration (1.012). This result indicates that, for the same 
level of increase in acquirer market returns relative to the historical 
aspiration level, the probability of making a subsequent acquisition increases
much greater when acquirer market returns is below the historical aspiration 
level than when it is above the historical aspiration level. To test whether the
change in the slopes below and above the historical aspiration level was 
statistically significant, we specified a marginal spline function in Model 2A, 
in which Marginal Acquirer Market Returns above Historical Aspiration 
measures the incremental change in the slope of Acquirer Market Returns 
above Historical Aspiration over the slope of Acquirer Market Returns below 
Historical Aspiration. The coefficient for Marginal Acquirer Market Returns 
above Historical Aspiration (-6.462) is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the negative change in the slopes below and above the 
historical aspiration level is statistically significant. Figure 1A, which is based 
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on Model 2, shows this relationship. Combined, these results provide support
for Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the relationship between acquisition 
performance (acquirer market returns) relative to the social aspiration level 
and the probability of making a subsequence acquisition is weaker when a 
firm’s acquisition performance remains below its social aspiration level than 
when it exceeds the level. In line with this prediction, the slope of the 
regression line for Acquirer Market Returns above Social Aspiration (8.695) is
greater than that for Acquirer Market Returns below Social Aspiration (5.826)
in Model 2. The positive coefficient for Marginal Acquirers Market Returns 
above Social Aspiration in Model 2A indicates that the slope increases by 
2.869 and that this difference is statistically significant. This result is shown 
in Figure 1B (based on Model 2). Taken together, these results provide 
support for Hypothesis 2.
 Insert Figure ── 1A and 1B about here ──
Hypothesis 3a predicts that when acquisition performance (acquirer 
market returns) is below aspiration levels, the positive relationship between 
acquisition performance relative to aspiration levels and the probability of 
making a subsequent acquisition is stronger for banks with high performance
variability in prior acquisitions than for those with low past performance 
variability. On the other hand, Hypothesis 3b predicts that when acquisition 
performance (acquirer market returns) is above aspiration levels, the 
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positive relationship between acquisition performance relative to aspiration 
levels and the probability of making a subsequent acquisition is weaker 
among banks with high performance variability in prior acquisitions than 
among those with low performance variability.
To better interpret these results, we visually depict the interaction 
effect of the predictors on the hazard rate of future acquisitions in Figures 2A
and 2B. Figure 2A is based on Model 3 and illustrates the effects of acquirer 
market returns relative to the historical aspiration level on the multiplier of 
the hazard rate of making a subsequent acquisition. The graph plots the 
regression of Acquirer Market Returns below/above Historical Aspiration at 
different levels of Acquirer Market Returns Variability within the data range 
corresponding to one standard deviation above and below the mean of each 
variable (Aiken & West, 1991). Similarly, Figure 2B, which is based on Model 
4, plots the regression of Acquirer Market Returns below/above Social 
Aspiration at different levels of Acquirer Market Returns Variability.
As predicted, Figure 2A shows that when acquirer market returns is 
below the historical aspiration level, the slope of the regression line is 
greater for the banks with high acquirer market returns variability (the 
dotted line) than those with low acquirer market returns variability (the solid 
line). By contrast, when acquirer market returns exceeds the historical 
aspiration level, the slope of the regression line is smaller for the banks with 
high acquirer market returns variability (the dotted line) than for the banks 
with low acquirer market returns variability (the solid line). In fact, when 
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acquirer market returns is above the historical aspiration level, the slope of 
the regression for banks with high acquirer market returns variability 
becomes almost flat (coefficient = 0.045), indicating that the probability of 
making subsequent acquisitions increases very slowly as the acquirer market
returns relative to the historical aspiration level increases. These results 
provide support for Hypothesis 3a. Figure 2B provides similar results for 
acquisition performance relative to social aspiration levels, supporting 
Hypothesis 3b.
 Insert Figures 2A & 2B about here 
The results for several control variables are worth mentioning. 
Consistent with the findings of prior acquisition studies, larger size, more 
slack resources, stronger financial performance, and stock consideration all 
increase the probability of making a subsequent acquisition while relative 
acquisition size decrease the probability of making a subsequent acquisition. 
As predicted, Acquisition Speed increases the probability of making a 
subsequent acquisition. Interestingly, Prior Acquisition Experience increases 
acquisition probability, but this finding disappears when Acquisition Speed is 
added to the models. All else being equal, the variability in the acquirer 
market returns of prior acquisitions increases the probability that a firm will 
make a subsequent acquisition, implying that high variability in prior 
acquirer market returns makes managers more optimistic about future 
acquisition performance.
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DISCUSSION
Building on the behavior theory of the firm, we have explored how the 
interpretation of performance feedback constrains and enables acquisition 
behavior. We find that acquisition behavior varies significantly depending 
upon whether historical or social aspiration levels are used to assess 
acquisition performance. Variability in prior acquisition performance 
moderates the relationship of performance relative to aspiration levels and 
acquisition behavior. These findings, when taken together, form a pattern of 
managerial behavior that is both revealing and suggestive of fruitful research
opportunities.
Theoretical Contributions, Major Findings, and Implications for 
Research
The feedback-based learning model suggests that organizations 
generate aspiration levels from their prior performance history (Lant, 1992; 
Lant & Montgomery, 1987) and/or by comparison with the performance of a 
reference group such as industry peers or direct competitors (Desai, 2008; 
Gooding, Goel, & Wiseman, 1996; Mishina et al., 2010). We question the 
traditional view that these two forms of aspiration levels affect firm behavior 
in a similar manner (Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998; Harris & Bromiley, 
2007). Since they arise from different sources of information and through 
different organizational processes, we posit that firms interpret and respond 
differently to these two forms of performance comparison. Consistent with 
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our predictions, we find evidence that historical and social aspirations 
produce distinct behavioral responses. This study is also the first to show 
that variability in acquisition performance has an influence on behavioral 
response patterns, that is, under conditions of high acquisition performance 
variability managers are more likely to perceive ‘false positives’ when 
performance exceeds aspirations and ‘false negatives’ when performance 
falls below aspirations.
Consistent with prior studies that have shown that strong performance 
reinforces existing strategies (Haleblian et al., 2006), we find that as a firm’s 
acquisition performance improves relative to the historical aspiration level, 
the probability of its making a subsequent acquisition also increases. Our 
study adds an important dimension to the base finding that the increase in 
the probability of making acquisitions is weaker when a firm’s acquisition 
performance remains above its historical aspiration level than when it 
remains below. While positive performance improvements relative to 
historical aspirations are clearly motivational, they also boost a firm’s 
performance expectation and shift its historical aspiration level upwards. 
Managers in this situation are likely to feel pressure to achieve even higher 
acquisition performance. Further, as performance improvement goes beyond
a point considered “normal” given their acquisition capabilities (as 
manifested in the historical aspiration level), they may find it increasingly 
difficult to better their performance (or even to replicate their former level of 
performance). Thus they take a step back and exercise greater caution 
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before making their next move, consequently delaying the onset of a new 
deal.
Performance above social aspirations yields similarly interesting 
findings. The positive relationship between acquisition performance relative 
to social aspiration levels and the probability of acquisitions is stronger 
(more positive) when acquisition performance is above its social aspiration 
level than when it remains below. Managers who seek to interpret others’ 
performance do not always have access to private knowledge required to 
accurately compare their performance with the performance of others; hence
they are often unaware of the specific underlying factors that explain 
differences in performance with peer firms. Under such conditions, they are 
prone to attribute strong performance to their own capabilities, which tilts 
the balance between momentum and caution toward momentum.
In addition, we find that prior performance variability moderates the 
relationship between performance relative to aspiration levels (both forms) 
and the probability of future acquisitions. Specifically, when acquisition 
performance remains below the aspiration level, the positive relationship 
between acquisition performance relative to aspiration levels is stronger for 
firms with high performance variability than those with low performance 
variability. Conversely, when acquisition performance exceeds the aspiration
level, the positive relationship between acquisition performance relative to 
aspiration levels is stronger for firms with low performance variability. High 
performance variability may thus be deemed an unreliable signal: for 
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performance above aspirations it makes managers doubt their ability to 
replicate the level of performance in the future, while for performance below 
aspirations they perceive a possibility to improve performance in the future. 
By contrast, when performance remains below aspirations, low variability 
may be taken as a sign that a firm has fixed capabilities that cannot be 
further improved, in which case it will hesitate to make further acquisitions. 
Overall, the unreliability of high variability in performance feedback 
intensifies the relationship between aspirations and future acquisitions below
aspirations but attenuates the relationship above aspirations.
Future Research
Our study primarily explores the question of the influence of past 
performance on managers’ behavior. The answer is apparently multi-faceted.
One would expect both performance relative to a firm’s historical record and 
relative to other firms to play their part. However, our interaction hypotheses
on performance variability make a credible attempt to capture additional 
complexity around managerial interpretations. The true picture is almost 
certainly more complex still. Managers likely consider absolute and relative 
performance, as well as performance variability, in a simultaneous manner, 
weighing each in various ways before reaching if not a conclusion, at least a 
sense of where the firm stands. While it is an empirical challenge to evaluate
the main and multiple interactions among the three types of performance 
assessments, we suspect that managers do so by relying on various 
heuristics that go beyond those we have chosen to focus on here.
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Despite this complexity, other research opportunities are apparent. For
one thing, the relative importance of each mode of performance feedback 
remains an open question. Perhaps more interesting is the question: Under 
what conditions are managers more likely to attend to the signals emanating
from historical and social acquisition performance, and the variability around
these levels? Prior work that uses different specifications of aspiration 
models provides important clues. Some models assume that decision makers
consider both social and historical information and combine them to form a 
single aspiration level (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 
2002). Other models posit that managers will attend to two aspiration levels 
separately and do not combine historical and social influences into a single 
aspiration level (e.g., Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Baum et al., 2005; Chen & Miller,
2007; Greve, 1998; Harris & Bromiley, 2007). A third set proposes that 
decision makers shift their attention between the two (March & Shapira, 
1992; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996).
These models represent different theoretical assumptions regarding 
information processing in organizations (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012: 897). 
Greve (2003a: 42), for example, suggests that managers will rely heavily on 
social aspiration levels if they believe the firm is comparable to others in an 
industry, and on historical aspiration levels if they consider their firm unique.
In a similar vein, the external context can also influence managerial 
perceptions of performance. In a dynamic, fast-changing environment, for 
example, historical performance may be less important to decision makers 
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than recent results. At other times—for example in industries with 
amorphous borders such as information technology, entertainment and 
telecommunications—firms may find that they monitor more than one set of 
competitors, each of which has some prominence in managerial thinking 
about strategy. While we have gained important insights on how the 
respective forms of aspirations differ in origin and process from these 
studies, we do not have definite answers as to how managers attend to two 
aspiration levels. The recently proposed varying parameters model is 
promising as it adds realistic assumptions about switching between two 
aspirations (Bromiley & Harris, 2014; Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). However,
we do not explore the switching model in our study because it does not allow
us to compare two aspiration levels, which is our main research interest. Our 
findings could potentially inform the switching model, and future studies 
using a switching model that reflects our findings may add considerable 
insights and further advance this promising model.
We advance the literature in performance feedback by exploring the 
effects of the variability in acquisition performance, an important dimension 
of performance feedback that has received little scholarly attention. In 
addition to the variability in acquisition performance, the variability in 
aspiration levels may influence the way managers interpret performance 
relative to aspiration levels. For example, a highly variable performance of 
the firms in the reference group increases the variability of social aspirations,
which in turn may cast doubt on the value of social aspiration as a useful 
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benchmark. Further work on the variability in historical and social aspiration 
levels should add important insights to the literature.
Our paper has potential limitations. First, there are some factors that 
may affect both the independent variable and the dependent variable, 
causing an omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2002). For example, the size 
of the focal acquisition may influence the performance of the acquisition as 
large acquisitions tend to perform poorly (King et al., 2004). It can also affect
the probability of making a subsequent acquisition as a large acquisition will 
prevent an acquirer from making another deal soon. Also, a large number of 
acquisitions in the industry intensify competition for targets, which may 
affect both the performance of the focal acquisition (competition for targets 
may prompt firms to acquire inadequate targets) and the future acquisition 
probability (competition for targets decreases the number of eligible 
targets). Thus, in building our empirical models, we added a comprehensive 
set of control variables to address the potential omitted variable bias, 
including the year fixed effect. However, given the complex interaction 
between acquisition performance and acquisition behavior, it is possible that 
there may be other potential factors that are not included in the model, 
which warrants a further investigation on potential omitted variables. 
Second, we have only examined the effects of performance aspirations and 
performance variability on the probability of making a horizontal acquisition; 
future work could broaden the focus of acquisitions to see if our findings hold
or are modified when firms face different acquisition types.
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Third, since our study proposed underlying psychological processes—
such as the effect of self-enhancement—that influence firm acquisition 
behavior but were not directly tested, the opportunity for future laboratory-
based work is apparent. Such as lab study work may be able to tease out the
specific underlying causal processes that our work suggests. Specifically, 
future work could isolate the causal chain in which aspirations first influence 
psychological processes, which subsequently impact behavior. Moreover, the
influence of performance variability also offers a fruitful avenue for further 
exploration in laboratory settings. Such research could examine how it 
impacts attentional processes. It would also be interesting to see to what 
degree individuals account for such variability, and how this changes their 
risk-seeking behavior. Finally, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that
managers have both levels of performance they aspire to (aspirations) and 
levels of performance they expect (expectations) (Cyert & March, 1963). 
Several notable studies considered both aspiration and expectation and 
explored the effects of “attainment discrepancy”—i.e., the difference 
between aspirations and expectations (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Lant & 
Montgomery, 1987; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). Due to the data limitation, 
we could not theorize and test the effects of expectations separately from 
aspirations. Future acquisition work that explores the role of both aspirations
and expectations could add valuable insights to both the performance 
feedback learning and the acquisition literature.
Conclusion
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Our study shows that not all aspirations are created equal. Indeed, 
they are differentially influenced both by type (historical vs. social) and by 
prior performance variability. We advance theories on learning from 
performance feedback by demonstrating that managerial interpretations of 
past acquisition performance play an important role in shaping a firm’s 
future acquisition behavior. Thus an interpretation-based perspective on the 
behavioral of the firm lends itself to a potentially more precise examination 
of feedback-based learning and aspirations. Further exploration of how 
managerial interpretations of performance feedback impact other forms of 
strategic behavior is to be encouraged.
Our study also adds an important insight to the acquisition literature. 
Scholars and practitioners alike have focused on managers’ hubristic 
behavior as an explanation for the paradox of making acquisitions despite 
poor acquisition performance (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Our study 
suggests that the way in which managers interpret prior performance may 
help to explain this. Importantly, their interpretations of performance need 
not be absolute; rather, by comparing acquisition performance to the 
historical record or to peer firms, managers likely assess success and failure 
in different ways. For example, even ‘lukewarm’ results from an acquisition 
may be acceptable when competitors do even worse. Indeed such managers 
may conclude that an acquisition was a “success” in comparison with their 
peers, and be more (rather than less) inclined to make subsequent 
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acquisitions. Hence, relative performance has real meaning as it helps 
motivate managers to act or not to act in their capacity as strategists.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 8,799)
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0-5 years 0.57 0.50
2 6-10 years 0.30 0.46 -.75
3 > 10 years 0.13 0.34 -.45
-.2
5
4 Acquirer Size 14.35 1.73 -.26 .13 .20
5 Acquirer Slack 0.66 0.11 .20 -.11
-.1
4
-.3
2
6 Acquirer Firm Performance 12.75 9.42
-.0
6 .03 .04 .20
-.0
1
7 Acquirer Cost of Fund 3.66 1.16 .19 -.03
-.2
5 .00
-.0
7
-.0
7
8 Relative Acquisition Size 0.19 0.25 .08 -.04
-.0
6
-.2
7
-.0
6
-.0
8 .02
9 Stock Consideration 0.49 0.50 -.02 .07
-.0
6 .13 .09 .07 .10 .00
10 Merger of Equals 0.02 0.15 .00 .00 .01 .03 -.04
-.0
1 .04 .48 .11
11 Lock-Up Agreement 0.24 0.43 -.10 .10 .01 .18
-.1
4 .04 .05 .20 .23 .15
12 Regional Acquisition Density 28.90 17.42 .06 .03
-.1
3
-.0
1 .13 .02 .11
-.0
8 .16
-.0
3
13 Regional Total Acquisition Value ($B) 5.88 10.28
-.1
1 .10 .02 .08
-.1
3 .01 .00 .13 .12 .11
14 Number of Banks 415.77 263.90 .06 -.05
-.0
3
-.0
7 .09
-.0
1 .03
-.0
2
-.1
6 .00
15 Bank Concentration 0.12 0.03 -.08 .04 .06 .00
-.1
5 .08
-.1
4 .01
-.0
1
-.0
2
16 First Acquisition Indicator 0.31 0.46 .30
-.2
0
-.1
7
-.4
6 .04
-.1
6 .07 .26
-.1
3 .05
17 Negative Inconsistency 0.02 0.04 .01 .00 -.01 .03 .01
-.1
2 .07 .00 .02 .03
18 Prior Acquisition Experience 5.44 10.36
-.2
9 .18 .18 .54
-.1
1 .14
-.0
4
-.2
0 .15
-.0
3
19 Prior Average Acquirer Market Returns -0.001 0.04 .02 .00
-.0
3
-.1
1 .02
-.1
5 .03 .01
-.0
1 .03
20 Acquisition Speed 0.56 0.98 -.24 .18 .11 .55
-.0
6 .15 .01
-.2
3 .17
-.0
3
21 Acquirer Market ReturnsVariability 0.02 0.03
-.1
6 .10 .09 .20
-.0
7 .09
-.0
4 .00 .09 .05
22 Acquirer Market Returnsbelow Historical Asp. -0.02 0.04 .06
-.0
5
-.0
3
-.0
5 .08
-.0
1 .00
-.1
8
-.0
8
-.1
0
23 Acquirer Market Returnsabove Historical Asp. 0.020 0.05 .04
-.0
2
-.0
3 .02 .01
-.0
8 .07 .00 .05 .03
24 Acquirer Market Returnsbelow Social Asp. -0.01 0.04 .06
-.0
1
-.0
7
-.0
3
-.0
2 .00 .00 .00 .01
-.0
2
25 Acquirer Market Returnsabove Social Asp. 0.01 0.02
-.0
1 .03
-.0
3 .13
-.0
1 .05 .05
-.0
8 .02
-.0
3
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
12 Regional Acquisition Density .00
13
Regional Total 
Acquisition Value 
(/1000)
.20 .12
14 Number of Banks (/100) -.17
-.0
1
-.1
7
15 Bank Concentration -.03 .03 .14 -.31
16 First Acquisition Indicator -.12
-.0
7
-.0
8 .05
-.1
0
17 Negative Inconsistency -.02 .02 .04 -.07 .02
-.0
1
18 Prior Acquisition Experience .02 .10 .09
-.0
6 .14
-.3
5 .05
19 Prior Average Acquirer -.10 .03 -.0 .00 .03 .07 .54 -.0
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Market Returns 1 3
20 Acquisition Speed .01 .14 .06 -.02 .09
-.3
8 .06 .95
-.0
4
21 Acquirer Market Returns Variability .13 .00 .07
-.0
4 .07
-.5
2 .09 .14
-.0
7 .14
22
Acquirer Market 
Returns below 
Historical Asp.
-.19 .03 -.05 .03
-.0
4 .10 .09
-.0
4 .17
-.0
2
-.3
3
23
Acquirer Market 
Returns above 
Historical Asp.
-.03 .10 .03 -.06 .04
-.0
2 .65 .08 .51 .07 .13 .18
24
Acquirer Market 
Returns below Social 
Asp.
.00 .10 .01 .04 .01 .02 -.01
-.0
9 .05
-.0
9
-.1
1 .01 .01
25
Acquirer Market 
Returns above Social 
Asp.
-.02 .07 .04 -.09 .09
-.1
0 .16 .19 .01 .22 .07 .01 .01 .11
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Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Subsequent Acquisitions (N = 8,799)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 2A Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Time Pieces
0-5 years 1.56** (.09) 1.47** (.09) 1.47** (.09) 1.48** (.09) 1.47** (.09) 1.47** (.09)
6-10 years 0.80** (.09) 0.76** (.09) 0.76** (.09) 0.77** (.09) 0.77** (.09) 0.77** (.09)
> 10 years -12.95** -12.89** (.46) -12.89** (.46) -12.90** (.46) -13.12** (.47) -13.07** (.47)
Acquirer 
Characteristics
Acquirer Size 0.21** (.02) 0.21** (.02) 0.21** (.02) 0.21** (.02) 0.22** (.02) 0.21** (.02)
Acquirer Slack 1.69** (.25) 1.77** (.25) 1.77** (.25) 1.75** (.25) 1.79*** (.25) 1.76** (.25)
Acquirer Firm 
Performance 0.04**
(.00
) 0.04** (.00) 0.04** (.00) 0.04** (.00) 0.04** (.00) 0.04** (.00)
Acquirer Cost of 
Fund 0.03
(.02
) 0.01 (.02) 0.01 (.02) 0.01 (.02) 0.02 (.02) 0.01 (.02)
Deal Characteristics
Relative Acquisition 
Size -0.55**
(.14
) -0.31* (.14) -0.31* (.14) -0.29* (.14) -0.32* (.14) -0.29* (.14)
Stock Consideration 0.27** (.04) 0.31** (.04) 0.31** (.04) 0.30** (.05) 0.32** (.04) 0.31** (.05)
Merger of Equals 0.07 (.20) 0.04 (.21) 0.04 (.21) 0.01 (.21) 0.02 (.21) 0.01 (.21)
Lock-Up Agreement -0.15** (.06) -0.08 (.06) -0.08 (.06) -0.07 (.06) -0.07 (.06) -0.07 (.06)
Regional M&A 
Pattern
Regional Acquisition
Density 0.01**
(.00
) 0.004** (.00) 0.004** (.00) 0.004** (.00) 0.004** (.00) 0.004** (.00)
Regional Total 
Acquisition Value 
(/1000)
-0.01** (.00) -0.01** (.00) -0.01** (.00) -0.01** (.00) -0.01** (.00) -0.01** (.00)
Number of Banks 
(/100) -0.02†
(.00
) -0.002 (.00) -0.002 (.00) 0.001 (.00) 0.001 (.00) 0.002 (.00)
Bank Concentration 0.78 (.88) 0.89 (.89) 0.89 (.89) 1.20 (.90) 1.15 (.90) 1.31 (.90)
Model Control 
Variables
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First Acquisition 
Indicator -0.82**
(.07
) -0.78** (.07) -0.78** (.07) -0.74** (.07) -0.76** (.07) -0.74** (.07)
Aspiration 
Inconsistency 2.39**
(.42
) 0.36 (.52) 0.36 (.52) 0.32 (.54) 0.03 (.53) 0.31 (.54)
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included
Acquirer Prior Acquisition 
Characteristics
Prior Acquisition 
Experience -0.01†
(.00
) -0.003 (.00) -0.003 (.00) -0.003 (.01) -0.003 (.01) -0.003 (.01)
Prior Average 
Acquirer Market 
Returns
-0.80 (.72) -2.34** (.83) -2.34** (.83) -2.01* (.83) -2.01* (.84) -1.94* (.85)
Acquisition Speed 0.44** (.06) 0.35** (.06) 0.35** (.06) 0.35** (.06) 0.34** (.06) 0.34** (.06)
Acquirer Market 
Returns Variability 0.36
(.86
) 1.80* (.82) 1.80* (.82) 5.66** (1.07) 4.02** (.91) 6.93** (1.11)
Historical Aspiration Levels (Hist. 
Asp.)
Acquirer Market 
Returns (AMR) 
below Hist. Asp.
7.47** (.88) 7.47** (.88) 5.11** (1.43) 7.40** (.88) 5.39** (1.43)
AMR above Hist. 
Asp. 1.01** (.36) 2.45** (.47) 1.23** (.37) 2.36** (.47)
Marginal AMR above
Hist. Asp. -6.46**
(1.02
)
Social Aspiration Levels (Soc. 
Asp.)
Acquirer Market 
Returns (AMR) 
below Soc. Asp.
5.83** (1.11) 5.83**
(1.11
) 5.82** (1.10) 2.00 (2.01) 1.70 (2.07)
AMR above Soc. 
Asp. 8.70** (.68) 8.89** (.69) 12.19** (1.16) 11.47** (1.21)
Marginal AMR above
Soc. Asp. 2.87*
(1.41
)
Interactions: Aspiration Levels x Acquire Market Returns Variability (AMR 
Variability)
AMR below Hist. 
Asp. x AMR 
Variability
67.62* (27.46) (.00) 57.76*
(27.1
0)
AMR above Hist. 
Asp. x AMR 
Variability
-40.09** (10.42) (.00) -35.60**
(10.6
7)
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AMR below Soc. 
Asp. x AMR 
Variability
120.70* (61.16) 134.13*
(64.3
2)
AMR above Soc. 
Asp. x AMR 
Variability
-
109.15**
(31.8
4) -85.33*
(34.5
9)
Log-Likelihood 190.16 355.21 355.21 368.34 365.03 374.08
Incremental LR  2 330.10** 330.10** 26.26** 19.64** 37.73**
DF 4 4 2 2 4
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; †p < 0.1; unstandardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses; the tests of 
significance shown in the table are two-tailed.
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Figure 1A: Historical Aspiration Levels and the Multiplier of Hazard
of Making Future Acquisitions
Figure 1B: Social Aspiration Levels and the Multiplier of Hazard of
Making Future Acquisitions
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Figure 2A: Interaction between Historical Aspiration Levels and
Variability in Acquisition Performance
Figure 2B: Interaction between Social Aspiration Levels and
Variability in Acquisition Performance
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